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A Logical Pragmatics Study of Argument in Islamic-Christian Debates

ABSTRACT

Lately, pragmatics has attracted the attention of linguists and philosophers. It has been integrated into many fields of study that have contributed to the study of language. A debate is a special form of an argumentative dialogue in which two or more parties take part in attacking and defending certain claims through reasoned discourse. This study has set itself to pragmatically analyze and evaluate selected arguments of religious debates. Islamic-Christian debates are specifically chosen as data for the current study because they have not received due attention in language studies. This study is essentially concerned with investigating the logical pragmatics in the context of Deedat-Swaggart's debate. Consequently, the study aims at: identifying the most frequently utilized logical pragmatics strategies; showing whether the pragmatic criteria are frequently kept to or violated. To fulfill the aims, it is hypothesized that debaters utilize certain logical pragmatics strategies (grounds, warrants, claims, backings, qualifiers, and rebuttals, certain types of reasoning, and argumentation schemes), the pragmatic criteria are frequently violated. The study employs a mixed method (qualitative and quantitative) to analyze the data and to verify or reject the hypotheses. The results of the study reveal that the most frequent pragmatic strategies utilized by Deedat are: grounds, deductive reasoning, argument from expert opinion. Swaggart, on the other hand, highly employs: grounds, presumptive reasoning, argument from expert opinion. The results have also shown that Deedat's chains of arguments are stronger and more persuasive than Swaggart's in terms of satisfying the logical criteria of argument evaluation.

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دراسة تداولية-منطقية للحجاج في مناظرات إسلامية-مسيحية

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الخلاصة

جذبت التداولية اهتمام اللغويين والفلاسفة في السنوات الأخيرة. و قد تم دمجها في العديد من مجالات الدراسة التي ساهمت في دراسة اللغة. تعد المناظرة شكلاً خاصاً من الحوار الجدلي الذي يشارك فيها طرفان أو أكثر في مهاجمة أو الدفاع عن بعض الادعاءات من خلال خطاب منطقي. تم اعداد هذه الدراسة لتحليل وتقييم حجج مختارة من المناظرات الدينية تداولياً. تم اختيار المناظرات الإسلامية-المسيحية على وجه التحديد بيانات للدراسة

الحالية لأنها لم تلق اهتماماً وافياً في دراسات اللغة. تُعنى هذه الدراسة أساساً بدراسة التداولية المنطقية في سياق مناظرات (ديدات-سواغات). وبالتالي، تهدف الدراسة إلى: تحديد الاستراتيجيات التداولية المنطقية الأكثر استخداماً، وإظهار إذا كان كثيراً ما يتم الالتزام بالمعايير التداولية أو انتهاكها. لتحقيق اهداف الدراسة، فقد افترض أن ديدات يستخدم استراتيجيات محددة من التداولية المنطقية (الأسس ، الضمانات ، الادعاءات ، الدعم ، المؤهلات ، والدحض ، أنواع معينة من الاستدلال وانماط الحجج)، ويلتزم المناظرين بقواعد تداولية معينة لإقناع جمهورهم ، يتم انتهاك المعايير التداولية للمكونات المنطقية. تستخدم الدراسة أسلوب مختلط (نوعي وكمي) لتحليل البيانات ولإثبات الفرضيات أو رفضها. تكشف نتائج الدراسة أن الاستراتيجيات التداولية الأكثر شيوعاً التي يستخدمها ديدات هي: الأسس ، والاستدلال الاستنتاجي، والحجة حسب رأي الخبراء. من ناحية أخرى، فإن سواكات يستخدم الأسس ، والاستدلال الافتراضي ، والحجة حسب رأي الخبراء. وقد أظهرت النتائج أيضاً أن سلاسل حجج ديدات أقوى وأكثر اقناعاً من حجج سواكات من حيث استيفاء المعايير المنطقية لتقييم الحجج.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التداولية المنطقية، انواع الاستدلالات، انماط الحجج، مناظرات اسلامية-مسيحية، التداولية

1. Introduction

Argumentation is a communicative process of supporting, modifying, criticizing a target claim. It involves engaging the minds of the audience through interaction (Rieke, Sillars and Peterson, 2013: 234). Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 2) define Argumentation theory as “an interdisciplinary academic field concerned with the study of argumentation, with contributions of scholars from disciplines such as philosophy, linguistics, psychology, political science, communication, artificial intelligence, and the law.” Levinson (1997: 59) (cited in Sultan and Younis, 2010: 2) asserts that pragmatics is concerned with how the context plays an important role in specifying the meaning of an utterance.

Speaking of logic, deductive syllogism is one of two species of argument recognized by Aristotle, in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises by means of logical entailment (Hurley and Watson, 2018: 5). Inductive syllogisms in which the conclusion is derived from a number of specific cases by means of generalization. Godden (2012: 3) argues that the classical logical perspective to argument is purely a semantic one. This means that an argument is defined as a set of propositions (two or more), one is a conclusion and the remainder(s) is/are premise(s). Such an approach does not only ignore pragmatic and contextual features of argument but rhetorical dimensions as well.

Heffernan and Burman (2005: 56) argue that “*The whole Christian/Muslim encounter in the early Islamic period could be characterized as a conflict over the proper understanding of the narratives in the scriptures*” (italics in origin). In such debates, the scriptural evidence (warrant) is said to be the most natural and strongest tool to dispute with, yet when faced with a religion that does not accept the scripture of others or rather does not accept them as divinely revealed but they have been corrupted by those who passed them (with definite evidence of distortion), the

matter becomes quite different.

To the best of the researcher's knowledge, no previous study that tackles the pragmatics of argument in I-CDs has been conducted. Within the scope of the present study, the questions that are intended to be answered can be formulated as follows:

- 1- What are the most frequent linguistic pragmatic strategies employed by the Muslim and the Christian debaters?
- 2- What is the most frequent type of reasoning utilized by Muslim and Christian debaters?
- 3- Which one of the criteria of argument evaluation is used more in the context of Islamic and Christian debates?

2. The Logical Pragmatics Approach to Argumentation

Generally speaking, Marciszewski (1981: viii) states that there are three entries in which logic is involved in the study of language: 'Syntax, logical', 'Semantics, logical', and 'Pragmatics, logical'. Logical pragmatics, according to Parret, Sbisá, and Verschueren (1981: 6), is a discipline that can be formulated in two ways: either by *logicizing pragmatics* or by *pragmatizing logic*.

Walton (1990: 417) defines logic as "the study of how normative models of reasoning are used in different contexts of dialogue." Its main aim is to evaluate reasoning in arguments. Walton (2007: 10) asserts that argumentation is no longer abstract but it has become contextual (pragmatics). Logical pragmatics is a practical discipline that is concerned with factors in the context of a dialogue. Walton (1990: 417-8) outlines a comparison between the (semantical/syntactical) logical theory and logical pragmatics one (or informal logic).

Huang (2014: 123) (Cited in Al-Hindawi and Al-Khazali, 2019: 5) states that pragmatics is at the heart of any theory that attempts to explore human language use. Johnson (2009: 26) suggests that "because arguments in real life are always situated in some context, it is natural to associate informal logic with pragmatics." The main two tasks which fall in the domain of pragmatics are supplying implicit (unstated) premises and clarifying the meaning of argument. Toulmin, on his part, proposes a model to show that the classical syllogism was inadequate for handling all cases of argumentation. This model can be applied to any field of argumentation.

2.1 Toulmin's Model of Argument Analysis

The British philosopher Stephen Toulmin (1958, 1984, 2003) advances a model that is used to describe a basic structure of all arguments. This logical model deals with the internal structure of a given argument. In other words, it investigates the relations between various components of an argument. Toulmin notes that different sorts of propositions that constitute an argument have different functions (Freeman, 1991: 4).

Toulmin et al., (1984) present a new terminology to classify the parts of an argument. They distinguish six roles of argumentative elements, listed below. The first three are basic parts of an argument (also called the primary triad). This means that ground-claim-warrant structure constitutes the inferential core of the argument. The

second three are additional (also called secondary triad), these elements extend the model. The six components of an argument are presented as follows:

1- Claims (C): the first component of an argument is the claim. The claim is the conclusion that an arguer wants to establish by an argument (Freeley and Steinberg, 2009: 163). Claims show the positions of arguers within argumentation. The key questions now are; “What is the arguer’s point? and “What he is trying to prove?” (Phillips and Bostian, 2015: 189).

2- Grounds (G): sometimes called data/datum or evidence. A claim should be based on fundamental assumptions. Grounds correspond to premises, such as ‘experimental observations’, ‘authorities’, ‘statistics’, ‘expert opinion’, ‘personal testimony’, ‘matters of common knowledge’, or even ‘previously established claims make up the pool of material used as grounds in an argument (Rybacki and Rybacki, 2012: 92). The question at this stage is: ‘What does an arguer have to go on?’.

3- Warrants (W): Bermejo-Luque (2011: 86) states that this component is “a key feature of Toulmin’s model.” Warrants are defined by Toulmin (Cited in Simosi, 2003: 186) as “rules or inference-licenses which can act as bridges and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits us.” The warrant responses to the challenge: ‘How does an arguer get there?’. Toulmin (ibid) claims that warrants are of different sorts, this means that they depend on the area of discussion. A warrant can be explicit or implicit, but it is frequently implicit.

Moreover, an arguer may provide his argument with additional support or qualification, because, in many cases, a ground-claim-warrant structure does not always give the listener a clear image of what an arguer wants to communicate. Backings, qualifiers, and rebuttals constitute the secondary triad in Toulmin’s model. This does not mean that they are unnecessary, these elements manifest accuracy, specificity, and even the integrity of an arguer. The key question at this stage is; How does an arguer prove his claim? (Phillips and Bostian, 2015: 190).

4- Backings (B): are defined by Simosi (2003: 186) as “assumptions which provide support to the warrants; it may take the form of factual information, or principles, values or beliefs.” Differentiating between warrants and backings, Toulmin (2003: 98) asserts that warrants are “bridge-like statements”, which provide direct support for a claim. Backings, on the other hand, provide indirect support to that claim. Rybacki and Rybacki (2012: 97) assert that backings justify belief in the warrant itself.

5- Qualifiers (Q): are utterances, words, or phrases, that help arguers to show the strength of a claim. This means that they qualify the claim, they show a certain degree of force that the claim possesses, such as ‘possibly’, ‘certainly’, ‘probably’, ‘perhaps’, ‘sometimes’, ‘necessarily’, ‘maybe’, ‘in certain cases’, ‘with the exception of’, ‘at this point in time’, etc. (Rybacki and Rybacki, 2012: 97).

6- Rebuttals (R): according to Toulmin (2003: 94) rebuttals are “circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside.” Put in other words, they are exceptional conditions under which claims are incorrect. A rebuttal explains why a belief in a claim needs to be redefined or modulated. This means that rebuttals may consist of doubts or counter-arguments regarding one of the components of the argument.

The following figure summarizes the relation between Toulmin's components of an argument.




Figure (1): Toulmin's Components of an Argument. Adopted from Toulmin (2003: 92)

2. 2 Reasoning and Argumentation Schemes

In recent years, researchers have shown an increased interest in approaching reasoning from a pragmatic point of view. Walton (1990: 403) defines reasoning as a process of moving from premises to conclusion by means of warrant. He (ibid: 411) states that "reasoning can be used in different speech acts, or contexts of discourse." Godden and Walton (2007: 267) state that argumentation schemes (henceforth, ASs) "are stereotypical patterns of defeasible reasoning that typically occur in everyday arguments."

2. 2. 1 Types of Reasoning

Mirza and Al-Hindawi (2016: 70) point out that when investigating types of reasoning a considerable number of logic books provide the twofold division: deductive and inductive reasoning. However, many scholars in this field of study are not satisfied with this division such as Peirce and Walton (ibid).

Walton et al., (2008: 1) claim that there is another type of reasoning, that is "neither deductive nor inductive". They (ibid) call it 'presumptive' reasoning. Moony (2005: 270) argues that this type of reasoning relies heavily on world knowledge. Yet, another type of reasoning suggested by Wellman (1971), the so-called conductive reasoning. The following subsections are dedicated to shed light on types of reasoning that are relevant to those that are used in the context of Islamic-Christian debates (henceforth, I-CDs).

2. 2. 1. 1 Deductive Reasoning

Rottenberg and Winchell (2018: 455) define deductive reasoning as "the reasoning by which we establish that a conclusion must be true because the statements on which it is based are true." A further definition is given by Gensler (2017: 75) who describes deduction as an argument which "claims that it's logically necessary that if the premises are all true, then so is the conclusion." A claim is said to derive its truth and reliability from its premises (reasons). Concerning this, Salmon (2013: 78) poses two important questions:

- i- Are the premises true? and;
- ii- Is the argument logical?

To answer the first question, Salmon (ibid) suggests that information about the world and the meaning of words constituting those forms of argument are needed. In addition to that, the context in which the argument occurs is no less important. Cavender and Kahane (2010: 10) claim that if the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion the argument is deductively valid. Consider (1) below:

1) If this wire is made of copper, then it will conduct electricity.

This wire is made of copper.

Therefore, this wire will conduct electricity.

2. 2. 1. 2 Inductive Reasoning

Hurley and Watson (2018: 37) state that in inductive reasoning “the content of the conclusion is in some way intended to go beyond the content of the premises.” An inductive reasoning makes a weaker claim from that in the deductive one. Gensler (2017: 75-76) suggests that this type of reasoning deals with probabilities. It rests on probabilistic reasoning. For example:

2) Major premise: The vast majority of entertainers are extroverts.

Minor premise: Stephen Colbert is an entertainer.

Conclusion: Therefore, Stephen Colbert is an extrovert.

Here, the conclusion does not follow from the premises given with strict necessity. But it follows with some degree of probability.

2. 2. 1. 3 Presumptive reasoning

Presumptive reasoning is pragmatic in nature. According to Reed and Walton (2001: 2), it “supports inference under conditions of incompleteness by allowing unknown data to be presumed, and defeasible conclusions can be withdrawn or modified if known (but uncertain) data turns out to be flawed.” Walton (2006: 84) declares that this type of reasoning is “neither deductive nor inductive in nature.”

Godden and Walton (2007: 270) claim that the scheme is determined by the type of the warrant in the argument. They (ibid) state that the warrant determines the level of specificity of a scheme. This means that each scheme presents a particular warrant. Presumptive reasoning can be formed to many common types of ASs. The following schemes are selected to encompass the portion of the argumentative discourse of I-CDs.

1. Argument from Expert Opinion

This type refers to any person or a group of persons who possess expertise in a specific field. It may refer to well-known professionals, scientists, physicians, jurists, leaders, public figures. Walton (2008: 209) argues that argument from expert opinion is reasonable. It is legitimate to appeal an opinion of an expert “to obtain advice or to draw a tentative conclusion on an issue *where knowledge is unavailable or inconclusive*” (emphasis mine) (ibid).

Walton (2006: 85) asserts that “an encyclopedia, a dictionary, a manual, a reference book, or computer database... or one may get information from another person who has the facts” all would be helpful to be used as kinds of evidence to support or refute arguments on one or the other side. The scheme of argument from

expert opinion has the following form:

Major Premise: Source *E* is an expert in subject domain *S* containing proposition *A*.

Minor Premise: *E* asserts that proposition *A* (in domain *S*) is true (false).

Conclusion: *A* may plausibly be taken to be true (false) (Walton et al., 2008, 19).

This argument is defeasible because it is seldom to treat an expert as infallible. There are six basic critical questions, (henceforth, CQs), that should be asked in order to evaluate this type of reasoning;

- **CQ1: Expertise Question.** How credible is *E* as an expert source?
- **CQ2: Field Question.** Is *E* an expert in the field that *A* is in?
- **CQ3: Opinion Question.** What did *E* assert that implies *A*?
- **CQ4: Trustworthiness Question.** Is *E* personally reliable as a source?
- **CQ5: Consistency Question.** Is *A* consistent with what other experts assert?
- **CQ6: Backup Evidence Question.** Is *E*'s assertion based on evidence?

2. Argument from Authority

Likewise, Rieke et al., (2013: 234) note that the fundamental forms in the history of religious arguments are found in reasoning from authority. They (ibid) add that "God, texts, and special humans serve as a universal principle, authority, that warrants the argument and justifies the claim." The documented evidence is preferred in the field of religion. Scriptures are warranted by the authority of the text itself. Like other types of arguments, argument from authority can be challenged.

Walton and Koszowy (2014: 5) suggest that there is another kind of authority other than argument from expert opinion, "in a case in which one might cite a religious authority." The suggested scheme of argument from authority is:

- **Major premise:** *A* is an administrative authority in institution *B*.
- **Minor premise:** According to *A*, I should do α .
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, I should do α .

The use of the argument from authority to support one's claim is considered to be a method of rhetoric reasoning (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 305). Argument from authority should be dealt with in accordance to its truth and falseness. They (ibid: 307) classify sources of religious authorities into certain types as they write: "The authorities invoked vary considerably. Sometimes, the authority will be ... 'the prophets. At other times, the authority will be impersonal: ... 'doctrine,' 'religion', or 'the Bible'." Walton and Koszowy (2014: 6-8) list seven CQs associated with this argument. These CQs can be used to raise doubts and to evaluate the argument:

- **CQ1:** Do [Does] I [the arguer] come[s] under the authority of institution [religion] *B*?
- **CQ2:** Does what *A* [Scripture or religious texts] says apply to my [his] present circumstances *C*?
- **CQ3:** Has what *A* says been interpreted correctly?
- **CQ4:** Is *A* genuinely in a position of authority?
- **CQ5:** Is *A* deontic rather than epistemic authority?
- **CQ6:** Did *A* perform a directive rather than an assertive?
- **CQ7:** Does someone claimed to be an authority utter assertives or directives?

3. Argument from Position to Know

Debaters, to a large extent, in I-CDs are considered to be highly qualified in the field of religion. Being in a position to know means that “having privileged access to facts or having wide database of previous similar event, while the privileged kind of information the expert had access to represents the possible interpretations of these facts and events” (Walton et al.,2008: 89). This type is defeasible when the opponent brings some good evidence to the surface.

Argument from position to know is a source-based reasoning (ibid). The scheme of this type of reasoning takes the following form:

- **Major premise:** Source *a* is in a position to know about things in certain subject domain *S* containing proposition *A*.
- **Minor premise:** *a* asserts that *A* is true (false).
- **Conclusion:** *A* may be plausibly taken to be true (false).

According to Walton et al., (ibid: 17), for an argument from position to know to be effective, it is necessary for an audience to accept *a* is honest. CQs that are associated with argument from position to know are:

- **CQ1:** Is *a* in position to know whether *A* is true (false)?
- **CQ2:** Is *a* honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?
- **CQ3:** Did *a* assert that *A* is true (false)?

4. Argument from Commitment

Walton et al. (2008: 132) argue that sub-types of commitment reasonings are found under this scheme. Some of them are related to “the prohibition on holding inconsistent commitments”, while in others “it is the ethos (ethical character) of the speaker that is related to an arguer’s commitment in various ways.” An arguer should hold certain characteristics such as sincerity, honesty, cooperative, and trustworthiness in addition to other aspects of character. It can be concluded that both “character and commitment are closely intertwined in argumentation” (ibid: 133). Argument from commitment scheme can be structured in the following form:

- **Commitment evidence premise:** It was shown that *a* is committed to proposition *A*, according to the evidence of what he said or did.
- **Linkage of commitment premise:** Generally, when an arguer is committed to *A*, it can be inferred that he is also committed to *B*.
- **Conclusion:** In this case, *a* is committed to *B* (Walton, 2006: 117-8).

There are two CQs that go with argument from commitment:

- **CQ1:** What evidence in the case supports the claim that *a* is committed to *A*, and does it include contrary evidence, indicating that *a* might not be committed to *A*?
- **CQ2:** Is there room for questioning whether there is an exception in this case to the general rule that commitment to *A* implies commitment to *B*?

5. Argument from Inconsistency (inconsistent commitment)

Argument from inconsistent commitment is a kind of “negative use” of argument from commitment (Walton, 2006: 120). In I-CDs, debaters use certain strategies to win over each other. One common way in this context is the inconsistency of an arguer’s past actions or statements which are brought to light. Inconsistency shows two

contradictory positions held by an arguer.

Logically speaking, it is not possible for both statements, if they really contradict each other, to be true. Historically, argument from inconsistency is one of the fallacious reasoning. Cavender and Kahane (2010: 54) believe that an arguer is also considered to be inconsistent when he “*argues one way at a given time and another way at some other time, or when talking to one person and then to another.*” (italics in origin). Walton (2006: 120) adds that “this kind of attack can be used to make an arguer appear to be illogical or even hypocritical.” Argument from inconsistent commitment has the following structure:

- **Initial commitment premise:** *a* has claimed or indicated that he is committed to proposition *A* (generally, or in virtue of what he said in the past)
- **Opposed commitment premise:** Other evidence in this particular case shown that *a* is not really committed to *A*
- **Conclusion:** *a*'s commitments are inconsistent (ibid).

Three CQs are appropriate to go with argument from inconsistent commitment, they are:

- **CQ1:** What is the evidence supposedly showing that *a* is committed to *A*?
- **CQ2:** What further evidence in the case is alleged to show that *a* is not committed to *A*?
- **CQ3:** How does the evidence from 1 and 2 prove that there is a conflict of commitments?

6. Argument from Analogy

Argument from analogy is one of the major forms of argumentation. In this type of reasoning “there are enough similarities between two things to support the claim that what is true of one is also true of the other” (Toulmin et al, 1984: 216). Rybacki and Rybacki (2012: 140) assert that argument from analogy supposes “some fundamental sameness exists between the characteristics of dissimilar cases.” Tindale (2007: 194) claims that logicians call this type of reasoning as ‘argument from analogy strategy’ in which the audience draws conclusion on the basis of the similarities between the cases compared. Walton (2006: 96) provides the following scheme for this type of reasoning:

- **Similarity premise:** Generally, case *C1* is similar to case *C2*.
- **Base premise:** *A* is true (false) in case *C1*.
- **Conclusion:** *A* is true (false) in case *C2*.

This form of reasoning is also defeasible, because both cases are similar to each other in certain respects but they are dissimilar in other respects (ibid).

The following CQs are associated with argument from analogy (ibid: 62):

- **CQ1:** Is *A* true (false) in *C1*?
- **CQ2:** Are *C1* and *C2* similar in the respects cited?
- **CQ3:** Are there important differences (dissimilarities) between *C1* and *C2*?
- **CQ4:** Is there some other case *C3* that is also similar to *C1* except that *A* is false (true) in *C3*?

7. Argument from Cause

Rybacki and Rybacki (2012: 130) define argument from cause as the type of

reasoning that “suggests a temporal connection between phenomena.” It is also named cause and effect reasoning. According to Freeley and Steinberg (2014: 181), a certain cause forces to produce an effect, as in:

3) **PHENOMENON 1:** *A student does not read his assignments.* (CAUSE)

PHENOMENON 2: *The student receives an F on an exam.* (EFFECT)

The scheme of argument from cause to effect can be put in the following structure:

- **Major premise:** Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
- **Minor premise:** In this case, A occurs (might occur).
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, in this case, B will (might) occur.

Whereas the structure of argument from effect to cause is:

- **Major premise:** Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
- **Minor premise:** In this case, B did in fact occur.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, in this case, A also presumably occurred (ibid: 170).

CQs that are associated with this type are:

- **CQ1:** How strong is the causal generalization (if it is true at all)?
- **CQ2:** Is the evidence cited (if there is any) strong enough to warrant the causal generalization?
- **CQ3:** Are there other causal factors that could interfere with the production of the effect in the given case?

2. 2. 3 Logical Pragmatics Argument Evaluation

Logical pragmatics does deal with argument validity. This means that a valid deductive argument in this approach cannot be good argument if it fails to satisfy a certain test. Salmon (2013: 78) suggests that to investigate the logical strength of ordinary-language arguments, one should look at: the meanings of the terms in the argument, and certain structural features of the arguments. Another significant aspect is proposed by Bickenbach and Davies (1996: 149) who assert that, when evaluating, the context in which an argument occurs should be taken into consideration.

According to Johnson and Blair (Cited in Eemeren, et al., 2014: 381), the three criteria, relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability, (henceforth, RSA), define “a logically good argument and any argument fails to satisfy one (or more) of these requirements is a fallacious argument.” This means that an argument is good if it passes the RSA test, that is, the ground must be relevant to the claim, it also (the ground) must provide sufficient support for its conclusion, and the ground must be acceptable (Johnson and Blair, 1994: 55).

2. 2. 3. 1 Relevance

The relevance criterion of a good logical argument states that “each premise of the argument must be relevant to the conclusion. The determination of relevance must be made taking into consideration every other premise of the argument” (Johnson and Blair, 1994: 304). Bickenbach and Davies (1996: 149) note that applying the criterion of relevance, one must ask “what the premises have to do with the conclusion.” Relevance is described as a relation of ‘aboutness’, ‘subject matter relatedness’, ‘probativity’, or simply being to the point rather than beside the point (ibid.: 164).

Johnson (2000: 202) believes that relevance is a pragmatic criterion, in the sense that what is relevant in one context is not necessarily relevant in another. Similarly. Al-Juwaid (2019: 51) states that this criterion is rooted in Grice maxim of relevance, that is, what is stated should be relevant to its context. Following Blair (1989), Johnson (2000: 202) puts relevance on the scale and suggests that “relevance is a matter of degree.” Since it is a context-dependent criterion, a relevant premise can be either ‘strongly relevant’ or ‘weakly relevant’. Tittle (2011: 110) argues that “relevance is a rational thing; a statement is relevant if it is important to something else, namely the proposed conclusion.” Relevance has to do with the claim

2. 2. 3. 2 Sufficiency

Even if the premises pass the relevance test, they may not provide sufficient support to the conclusion. Johnson and Blair (1994: 75) assert that sufficiency criterion refers to the appropriate types and amounts of evidence that support the claim. In debates, which have the dialectical setting of argumentation, both parties compete on an issue and attempt to show that only one view is correct, in such cases, it is not enough to present reasons or evidence that led to accept the claim. When one party presents evidence that opposed the claim of the other party, the latter should respond to competing claims on the issue and to the reasons why that party might resist his claim (ibid).

Bickenbach and Davies (1996: 168) point out that there is no specific number of premises that counts as enough support for the claim. It is not even true that more premises an argument has, the more sufficient it will be. But it “is wise to check their strength (the acceptability of each of the premises) and their ability to fit together (the relevance of the premises to sub-conclusions and the main conclusion) before testing the strength and stability of the structure as a whole.” (ibid).

2. 2. 3. 3 Acceptability

Both relevance and sufficiency are concerned with the relationship between the premises and the conclusion. According to Johnson and Blair (1994: 76), acceptability has to do with the relationship between the premises and the audience, that is, whether “the premises live up to the audience’s own standard.” A premise is acceptable when “it is reasonable to expect a member of the audience to take the premise without further support” (ibid: 297).

Johnson (2000: 201) claims that ambiguity, vagueness, and equivocation are instances of the violation of the acceptability criterion. For this criterion to be applied, one must ask “Is this premise one which the audience is prepared to accept?” Eemeren et al., (2014: 382) state that this criterion is the counterpart of the “logical criterion of truth” of the premises. Hamblin states (Cited in Johnson, 2000: 192) “If we are to draw the line anywhere, acceptance by the person the argument is aimed at-the person for whom the argument is argument is the appropriate basis of a set of criteria.”

Indeed, it is irrational to accept the ground and the warrant and reject the claim at the same time. Worded differently, if an arguer accepts, asserts, or believes A and B, then he must be committed to C, if C logically follows from A and B. If the arguer rejects to take C, then he is charged to be inconsistent (Johnson, 2000: 193).

2. 3 Methodology

2. 3. 1 Data Collection and Description

The data to be analyzed in the present work includes (8) arguments. They are taken from a debate between Mr. Deedat and Mr. Swaggart that was held on the 3rd of November, 1986 at the University of Louisiana in the USA.

2. 3. 2 Research Design

This study adopts a mixed method to analyze the data chosen, i.e., a qualitative and a quantitative method. It depends on a mixed method since the qualitative one allows deeper understanding of the language analyzed. The quantitative method is also utilized in order to support the findings based on the qualitative analysis.

2. 3. 3 The Model adopted

The analysis will be an eclectic model. It is important to note that the model involves two dimensions; a descriptive (pragmatic), and a normative dimension. The former encompasses Toulmin's model (2003), types of reasoning, and a brief pragmatic interpretation, whereas the latter includes the three criteria (RSA) for evaluating inductive and deductive reasoning, and CQs that evaluate presumptive reasoning.




Figure (2): The Model Adopted

2. 3. 4 Data Analysis

This section is devoted to show the analysis of data according the model adopted.

Jimmy Swaggart

I am in time again I have, before vast television audiences, I have held up this Bible or one like it, and I am sure most of you have seen me do it. I have done it through television to one hundred forty countries of the world, and I have stated "this is the word of Almighty God," I have stated that there is no other word of God, and we live,

die, sink, or swim on this book. I believe that, and I believe that with all of my heart. But of course, saying that is really cheap. Those types of words do not really cost that much. And I want to start this out tonight by quoting a passage of scripture that Mr. Deedat and I might disagree somewhat over. But which is one of the dearest passages in the word of God to the world of Christendom found in Saint John 3:16, "For God so loved the world that He gave his only unique son. That whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life." And I want to use that as the basis for this simple statement that I would attempt to make tonight.

Logical Pragmatics Analysis

Logical pragmatics comprises the following tasks; identifying the pragmatic components of the argument, recognizing the type(s) of reasoning employed, evaluating the argument, giving a brief interpretation and identifying what has left implicit. As for the first task, the components of the argument can be depicted as follows:

- **Grounds:** I [Swaggart] have held up this Bible or one like it. I have done it through television to one hundred forty countries of the world. and I have stated "this is the word of Almighty God."
- I [Swaggart] believe that this is the word of God.
- **Claim:** (stated as a premise) The Bible is the Word of God.
- **Warrant:** (unstated) Since Swaggart has held the Bible and stated that 'it is the word of God', then, the Bible is the word of God.
- **Rebuttal:** [By only] saying the 'Bible is the Word of God' is really cheap. [because] Those types of words do not really cost that very much.
Therefore, the Bible is the word of God.

The last conclusion is Swaggart's ultimate claim that he is trying to prove by his chain of arguments. Concerning the type of reasoning, Swaggart makes use of presumptive reasoning. The scheme that he employs is an **argument from position to know**. Accordingly, the argument can be structured in the following way:

- **Major premise:** Swaggart is in a position to know that the Bible is the word of God. (*since he is a priest and has knowledge about the subject and he is well-known in his community*)
- **Minor premise:** Swaggart asserts that the Bible is God's Word.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the Bible is God's Word.

This scheme is associated with three CQs that question the grounds of the argument as an evaluation. Out of these CQs related, this argument satisfies **CQ3** only. Swaggart presupposes that it is a privilege to show up on TV screens and to preach in front of a mass audience. He thinks it is an advantage to judge some propositions in this field. Swaggart reports what he has previously stated in a context that is completely different from the current one. Obviously, the effectiveness of the argument has less impact even on the Christian audience members because they believe what Swaggart believes. So, they expect more than repeating what they have already accepted to be true to reinforce their faith. Accordingly, the argument is out of context due to the norms that govern the context of the debate.

One possible pragmatics interpretation of the verse that Swaggart quotes from the Bible is to attribute God's qualities and power to Jesus (PBUH), and to say that he is the son of God. This directly supports the position of Christianity which implies that it is the only true religion because its followers believe in God Himself. So, Christians will be saved and have eternal life, and those who don't believe in Jesus (PBUH), i.e., Muslims, will be condemned. The content of this verse neither supports nor is supported by any of the preceding or the following premises. It plays no logical role in the argument. It can be stated that it is out of context since Swaggart refers to a topic other than the issue at stake, 'Is the Bible the Word of God?' It is irrelevant in the sense that it contributes zero to Swaggart's ultimate claim. At this point, Swaggart raises an issue other than proving the authenticity of the Bible.

Jimmy Swaggart

There is no book on the face of the earth that has the textual criticism that this book has had. I sort of feel insignificant when I stand here attempting to speak about the Bible, when I realize that some of the world's most eminent scholars have critically looked at every single text over and over and over again, sparing no expense, no time, no effort ascertain it was what it said it was. I have read the Bible many, many, many times, and others such as I have read it many more times, much more educated than I could ever be, understanding both Hebrew and Greek.

Analysis

The components of this argument can be put in the following way:

- **Grounds:** I [Swaggart] have read it [the Bible] many more times.
- And others such as I have read it [the Bible] many more times, much more educated than I could ever be, understanding both Hebrew and Greek.
- **Claim:** Some of the world's most eminent scholars have critically looked at every single text over and over and over again, sparing no expense, no time, no effort ascertain it was what it said it was [no changes have been taken place].
- **Warrant:** (unstated) The world's most eminent scholars are highly qualified and they are in a position to judge whether the text of the Bible is authentic and or not.

Therefore, the Bible is the word of God.

Swaggart utilizes **argument from expert opinion** scheme as a subtype of presumptive reasoning which can be presented below:

- **Major premise:** (unstated) The world's most eminent Bible scholars are experts in the domain of the religious texts and they are in a position to judge whether the Bible is the Word of God or not.
- **Minor premise:** They [the world's most eminent Bible scholars] have critically looked at every single text in the Bible many times and they ascertain that the Bible was what it said it was.
- **Conclusion:** (unstated) Therefore, the proposition "the Bible is the Word of God" may plausibly be taken to be true.

Concerning the six CQs associated with this scheme, assuming that these experts are trustworthy, Swaggart does not give any details about the source of his evidence neither tells whether the source is consistent with what other experts assert. Thus, **CQ5** and **CQ6** are not fulfilled.

In this argument, Swaggart attempts to support his ultimate claim that the Bible is God's Word in two ways. First, he brings to light the point of view of the most eminent scholars of the Bible in the world. Secondly, he has read the Bible many times and he found no sign indicates that the Bible is corrupted. He demotes himself compared to these scholars who are superior that, according to Swaggart, they have made a great effort examining the whole texts of the Bible and they concluded that the Bible was not changed.

Jimmy Swaggart

Now, some mention about the many versions of the Bible. Really, that is an incorrect statement. There is only one version of the Bible. There are many translations. Our scholars argue constantly over various translations. King James Version, as we use that term, as I mentioned incorrectly, is really a translation. Others have been put out, they were critical of the King James, even to the point of laboring incessantly to derive the Old Testament from the Hebrew in which it was written, minus a few verses in Aramaic, and the New Testament in Greek. Translations, some are incorrect, we think. I personally like the King James.

Logical Pragmatics Analysis

As for the components of the argument, they can be put as follows:

- **Grounds:** Some [Muslims] mention about the many versions of the Bible.
- King James is really a translation [of the Bible].
- Others [translations] have been put out, they were critical of the King James, even to the point of laboring incessantly to derive the Old Testament from the Hebrew in which it was written, minus a few verses in Aramaic, and the New Testament in Greek.
- **Claim:** There is only one version of the Bible.
- **Warrant:** Our [Christian] scholars argue constantly over various translations [of the Bible].

Therefore, the Bible is the word of God.

With respect to the type of reasoning employed, Swaggart makes use of inductive reasoning:

- **Major premise:** Christian scholars argue over various translations of the Bible.
- **Minor premise:** Some translations are incorrect.
- **Extra premise:** The (KJV) is really a translation.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, there is only one version of the Bible.

As far as the three criteria (**RSA**) of evaluating this type of reasoning are concerned, the premises are relevant to the conclusion. Thus, the relevance criterion is satisfied. The second criterion is also achieved with the presence of the argument from analogy below that supports the claim. Regarding the third criterion, the premises are logically questionable and not acceptable.

Swaggart's assertion "some mention about the many versions of the Bible" is a presupposed accusation that the Bible has been distorted and Christian scholars have been changing the words of the scripture, and this is at the heart of this debate. Pragmatically speaking, admitting the existence of multiple versions of the Bible is accepting the proposition that the Bible is distorted. In spite of the fact that Swaggart uses the term 'version' when he speaks about (KJV), he argues that the different copies of the Bible are the results of different translations of Hebrew and Greek into English. This implies that these scriptures do not contradict each other in content since they differ in translation only and one of the translations is the (KJV) that he prefers among them. Obviously, Swaggart treats the term 'version' as a synonym for the term 'translation'.

Jimmy Swaggart

However, the Quran has been translated as well into many languages. There have been different translations of the Quran in English, in South African, and Mr. Deedat can correct me if I am wrong. I think it was 1978, the Quran, one particular translation was released that was argued over, and I think demanded that it be pulled from the market. So, the scholars of The Qur'an have the same problem trying to pull one language over into another that we have in Christendom. That is not easy. In some languages there is even no word for what you are trying to say. So, it is very, very difficult to at times come up with the perfect word to fit what was written in the ancient Hebrew or the ancient Greek, Corinth Greek.

Analysis

The pragmatic components of Swaggart's argument can be presented in the following form:

- **Grounds:** The Qur'an has been translated as well [a similar case to the Bible] into many languages.
- [In] 1978, The Qur'an, one particular translation was released that was argued over, and I think demanded that it be pulled from the market.
- **Claim:** The scholars of The Qur'an have the same problem trying to pull one language over into another that we have in Christendom.
- **Warrants:** (unstated) The Bible is a similar case to The Qur'an that both revealed in languages other than English.
- (unstated) Since you (Muslims) believe in The Qur'an that has different translations, you should accept the proposition 'the Bible has different translations.
- **Backing:** In some languages, there is even no word for what you are trying to say.
Therefore, the Bible is the word of God.

As far as the type of reasoning is concerned, Swaggart, in this piece of discourse, exploits **argument from analogy**. The scheme can be portrayed as follows:

- **Similarity premise:** Generally, The Holy Qur'an is a similar case to the Bible since both scriptures revealed in languages other than English.
- **Base premise:** A particular translation of The Qur'an was argued over.
- **Conclusion:** Translations of the Bible are argued over as well.

In light of CQs associated with reasoning from analogy, the question of whether there

are different translations of The Qur'an that are different from each other is not satisfied. Thus, this argument violates CQ1, CQ2, and CQ4.

To begin with, this argument supports the previous one. The starting point which Swaggart begins from is that The Glorious Qur'an, in 1978, in South Africa, has been translated from Arabic into English, then it has been pulled from the market due to many errors that occurred in that translation. Swaggart argues that The Holy Qur'an is similar to the Bible because they are revealed to prophets in languages other than English. So, it is considered the same problem that scripture scholars have faced in both religions. Swaggart supports this claim by posing an acceptable linguistic issue that in some languages there are no equivalent words to translate into another.

Moderator: Now, brother Ahmad Deedat.

Ahmad Deedat

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

فويلٌ للذين يكتبون الكتاب بأيديهم ثم يقولون هذا من عند الله ليشتروا به ثمناً قليلاً فويلٌ لهم مما كتبت أيديهم وويلٌ لهم مما يكسبون. صدق الله العظيم. سورة البقرة

Then woe to those who write The Book with their own hands, and then say: "This is from God." To traffic with it for a miserable price! Woe to them for what their hands do write, and for the gain they make thereby. (The Holy Qur'an, 1: 79) (Ali, 1989: 38).

Mr. Chairman and brethren, though I wanted to go straight to the subject, the plea that brother Swaggart had made, forces me to make a confession of faith. And that is we Muslims happen to be the only non-Christian faith which makes an article of faith for its followers to believe in Jesus. No Muslim is a Muslim if he does not believe in Jesus. We believe that Jesus Christ was one of the mightiest messengers of God. We believe that he was the Messiah, we believe in his miraculous birth, which many modern Christians reject today. We believe that he gave life to the dead by God's permission, and he healed those born blind and lepers by God's permission. We are going together. The only parting of the ways, the only real difference between the Muslim and the Christian is that we say that he is not God the Almighty in human form. He is not God incarnate, and he is not the begotten son of God. Metaphorically, we are all the children of God, the good and the bad. And Jesus would be closer to being the son of God than any of us because he would be more faithful to God than any of us can ever be. From that point of view, we would agree that he is more preeminently the son of God. But not as the Christians say that he is the only begotten son of God, begotten not made, not in that sense.

Analysis

As far as the logical pragmatics strategies are concerned, the pragmatic components of the first argument can be put as follows:

- **Grounds:** Then woe to those who write the book with their own hands, and then say "This is from Allah", to traffic with it for a miserable price! Woe to them for what their hands do write, and for the gain they make thereby.
- **Counter Claim:** (unstated) Christians have altered the Bible with their hands

and they say that this is from God.

- **Warrants:** (unstated) The Glorious Qur'an is a trustworthy and a great authoritative source because it is the true word of God.
- (partly stated) Christians and Jews have altered their scriptures with their hands and they say that 'This is from Allah' to traffic with it for a miserable price.

Therefore, the Bible is not the word of God.

Clearly, this argument is represented by the scheme of **argument from authority**. With reference to **CQs** associated with this type of reasoning: this argument violates the first CQ only because Swaggart does not come under the authority of The Qur'an. Generally speaking, the argument is aimed at refuting what Christians say about the Bible printed today that it is the true word of God. Particularly, Deedat tries to refute what Swaggart has presented previously in the debate. This argument is directed towards Muslims to strengthen their faith. Concerning the second argument, the pragmatic function of the components of the argument can be put as follows:

- **Grounds:** We [Muslims] believe that Jesus Christ was one of the mightiest messengers of God. We [Muslims] believe that he [Jesus] was the Messiah, we believe in his miraculous birth, which many modern Christians reject today. We [Muslims] believe that he [Jesus] gave life to the dead by God's permission, and he healed those born blind and lepers by God's permission.
- Metaphorically, we [Muslims and Christians] are all the children of God.
- **Claim:** We Muslims happen to be the only non-Christian faith which makes an article of faith for its followers to believe in Jesus. No Muslim is a Muslim if he does not believe in Jesus.
- **Warrant:** (unstated) True Christians believe that Jesus is one of the messengers of God. They also believe that Jesus is the Messiah.
- **Rebuttal:** Unless Christians believe that Jesus is God Almighty in human form or He is God incarnate, and he is the begotten son of God.

In this argument, Deedat employs a deductive reasoning which can be presented in the following form:

- **Major premise:** (partially stated premise) Christianity is a religion which its followers believe in Jesus as; one of the messengers of God, his miraculous birth, he gave life to the dead by God's permission, and he healed those born blind and lepers by God permission.
- **Minor premise:** Islam is a religion that its followers believe in Jesus and his miracles.
- **Extra premise:** No Muslim is a Muslim if he does not believe in Jesus
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, we Muslims happen to be the only non-Christian faith which makes an article of faith for its followers to believe in Jesus.

With reference to the three criteria (**RSA**) of argument evaluation, this argument is considered a starting point for Deedat to refute Swaggart's argumentation as he grounds his arguments on premises that Christians are committed to, in order to show how both religions are interrelated. Thus, Deedat's argument satisfies the three criteria mentioned above.

Deedat initiates his argumentation with a verse from The Holy Qur'an that its

pragmatic function as a rebuttal defeater that refutes what his opponent has presented before. As a starting point, Deedat shows what both religions have in common in the sense that Muslims are considered to be the non-Christian faith because they believe in what Christians believe about the prophet Jesus (PBUH). Deedat supports his argument by **“No Muslim is a Muslim if he does not believe in Jesus.”** This means that believing in messengers and their Holy Books is part of Muslims’ faith. According to Deedat, the crossway between Muslims and Christians is that Muslims do not believe that Jesus is God Almighty. Unlike Christians nowadays, Muslims believe that Jesus (PBUH) is human created by God Almighty and he is not a begotten son of God because God is not begotten nor does He beget.

Ahmad Deedat

Now, prepare for the shock! I said prepare for the shock! From these thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations. They say “Yet the King James Version has grave defects and that these defects are so many and so serious as to call for revision in the English translation.” These are not my words. They revised it. And in the revision, the King pin of the Evangelist, the preacher, the hot gospeler, the Bible thumper (John 3:16) – no single preacher is worth the name if he can’t clinch the deal with (John 3:16). (John 3:16 From the Authorized KJV; “For God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son.” My brother Swaggart changed the word “begotten” to “unique” this is not from the King James Version. The King James Version says “begotten.” I heard brother Swaggart on Tv or video this morning. There he is speaking to a group, as if it was his own church group – you know-he’s giving some lessons on Babylon. It was that or another one – he used the word “begotten” this morning. And in eight hours’ time, he changed it to “unique.” I am asking are you ashamed of the word “begotten”? Are you ashamed of it? That Jesus was His only begotten son? And brother Swaggart in one of these thirty books – that I had to purchase in South Africa before coming, these are his books, more than thirty I purchased, and I went through each and every one of them, I had to. I wanted to know what my brother is talking about. What does he really believe? Because generally when you speak to a Christian, every Christian happens to be unique, absolutely unique. As soon as you corner him in some way, he says “but I don’t believe in that.” And every one of these thousand million, everyone I meet, he is unique, everyone is unique. He belongs to the Church of England, but he doesn’t believe, you know, what the Church of England teaches. He belongs to the Roman Catholic Church, but he doesn’t really believe what the Roman Catholic Church teaches. Everyone is unique. So, I said now what does he say in Black and White? And in Black and White I found that he uses (John 3:16) and in his quotation in his books he says “begotten.” Tonight, he said unique. Can you see the reason? The reason is obvious. The Muslims have been taking exceptions to these terms. In the Holy Quran we are told that God Almighty He does not beget, and He is not begotten, and there is nothing like unto Him. Then, in very strong terms the Quran condemns this idea that God begot a son because begetting is an animal act, it belongs to lower animal functions of sex, and we are not to attribute such a quality to God. As the Christian says in his Catechism. He says, “Jesus is the only begotten son, begotten not made.” And I have been asking

Christians, “Please explain what are you really trying to emphasize when you say begotten not made? What are you really trying to tell me?” And believe me in forty years no English man worth the name has opened his mouth to me to explain to me what this word means “begotten.” It had to be an American, he was on a visit to Durban, and he came on a guide to our mosque, and I happened to be a guide. And discussing it came up I said what does it mean, what are you are trying to tell me? What does it mean to say begotten not made? He said it means this – this American tells me – it means Sired by God. I said “what!!!” He said, “No, no, no, I don’t say that. This is what it means.” And believe me that is what it means. “Begotten not made” means Sired by God.

Analysis

Deedat uses many premises as grounds that provide support for his claim that the Bible is distorted and it still being distorted. The components of this argument can be depicted as follows:

- **Grounds:** Thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations state “Yet the (KJV) has grave defects and that these defects are so many and so serious as to call for revision in the English translation.”
- The authorized (KJV), John 3:16 says; “For God so loved the world that He gave His only *begotten* son.”
- Swaggart changed the word ‘begotten’ to ‘unique’.
- I [Deedat] heard Swaggart on TV this morning, he used the word ‘begotten’ and in eight hours he changed it to ‘unique’.
- (paraphrased) In one of his books, Swaggart writes ‘begotten’ but in the debate he has changed it to ‘unique’.
- (paraphrased) The reason behind changing the word ‘begotten’ to ‘unique’ is that Swaggart knows that Muslims have been taken exceptions to these terms.
- (paraphrased) I [Deedat] met a Christian and I asked him about the word ‘begotten’, he replied ‘It means sired by God’
- The word ‘begotten’ means ‘sired by God’
- **Counter Claim:** (unstated) (KJV) is distorted.
- **Warrants:** (unstated) Words, phrases, and sentences must not be changed in the holy book.
- (unstated) The thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations are trustworthiness because they are Christians, qualified and experienced in studying the biblical texts.
- (unstated) If words were changed in the holy book, it would be considered a distorted text which make it not the word of God.

Therefore, the Bible is not the word of God.

As for the type of reasoning employed in this argument, it can be stated that the first scheme is *argument from expert opinion*. Deedat tries to refute Swaggart’s argumentation from Christians’ evaluation of the Bible. This means that Deedat uses the judgement of the highest eminence scholars of the Bible, who are considered to be

the main contributors of publishing the (RSV). The argument can be structured as follows:

- **Major premise:** Thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations who are experts in the biblical texts and they are in position to make evaluation in this domain.
- **Minor premise:** These Bible scholars state that “the (KJV) has grave defects and these defects are so many and so serious as to call for revision of the English translation.”
- **Conclusion:** The proposition “the Bible [the (KJV)] is not the word of God” may plausibly be taken to be true.

Regarding argument evaluation, the six **CQs** associated with the argument from expert opinion are satisfied. This long excerpt belongs to one coherent argument that has a complex structure in the sense that each of the premises or facts is supported by at least two or more reasons. Deedat reveals another live logical proof of altering and changing the words of the Bible. The quotation Swaggart has made in his defending stage (A) from the (KJV), John 3:16, is a distortion because Swaggart has changed the word ‘begotten’ to ‘unique’. This is manifested by a second scheme, **arguments from inconsistent commitment** (or inconsistency), that supports Deedat’s claim that the (KJV) is not the word of God. The scheme can be structured in the following way:

- **Initial commitment premise:** In his book and when he was lecturing on TV, Swaggart has recited the biblical verse John 3: 16 with the word begotten.
- **Opposed commitment premise:** In the debate, Swaggart has changed the word ‘begotten’ to ‘unique’.
- **Conclusion:** Swaggart is inconsistent.

The three associated **CQs** of this scheme are satisfied. This inconsistency implies the distortion of the biblical words which gives a strong support for Deedat’s position and ultimate claim. Deedat reveals the reason of why Swaggart has changed the word ‘begotten’ to ‘unique’. He asserts that the presence of the Muslim audience is the reason behind the inconsistency found in Swaggart’s recitation of John (3:16). The reason is drawn by a deductive type of reasoning shown below:

- **Major premise:** The Glorious Qur’an condemns the idea that God Almighty begot a son and says “God Almighty does not beget and He is not begotten and there is nothing like unto Him.”
- **Extra premise:** Such quality belongs to lower animal function of sex.
- **Minor premise:** Muslims follow the teachings of The Glorious Qur’an.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, Muslims cannot attribute these acts to God Almighty.

In this argument, Deedat unveils one of the beliefs in Islam that contradicts one of the major premises on which Christianity is based on. The argument satisfies the three pragmatic criteria (**RSA**) since Deedat’s intention is not to support his claim that the (KJV) is distorted but to show the reason behind Swaggart’s distortion. By the premise “**He [a Christian] belongs to the Church of England, but he doesn’t believe, ... Church teaches**”, Deedat intends to show that Christians’ faith is not build upon solid evidence or good grounds.

Ahmad Deedat

You said this morning, I heard the tape, you said, “Even one word, if it is not supposed to be there is there, the whole book should be thrown away.”, the whole book. But it is not only one word. There are chunks and chunks of it, according to your revisers. And brother Swaggart tells me in one of his books that if you want to know anything factual, knowledge on any subject, you go to the experts. And he gives an example that if you want to know something about geology, you go to the geologist. If you want to know about the Bible, where do you go? To the barber? To the shoemaker? No, you go to the Bible experts, the Bible scholars. And they are telling you that this is a fabrication. Then, the Trinity, Fathers and the Holy Ghost. Brother Swaggart also at verbatim from the first episode of John Chapter 5, verse7, where it says “For there are three bear record in heaven, the Father, the word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one.” If he gives me time and says “which book?” I can open it and show it to you which book at verbatim his quotation. I said “but it is not in my Bible.” Is this not the word of God? In my Bible it is not there [The RSV]. Why is it not there? Because your scholars, thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations, Bible scholars, they say that this is another fabrication, another interpolation. So, they also threw it out without any ceremony. So, two, and I give you the ascension. Brother Swaggart quotes in his book (Water Baptism) [Mark 16:16] another place [Mark 16:19]. I say it is not in my Bible. I didn’t print this. The Jews didn’t print it. The Hindus didn’t print it. You Christians, you produced this book, and you are telling me this is the most up-to-date Bible going to the most ancient manuscripts. So, I looked up for (Mark 16) I see it ends at verse eight. Nine to twenty is missing. Did I take it out? The Muslims took it out?

Analysis

The pragmatic component of Deedat’s argument can be put as follows:

- **Grounds:** I [Deedat] heard the tape, you [Swaggart] said, “Even one word, if it is not supposed to be there is there, the whole book should be thrown away.”
- Swaggart tells me [Deedat], in one of his books, if you want to know anything factual, knowledge on any subject, you go to the experts.
- Swaggart also at verbatim from the first episode of John Chapter 5, verse7, where it says “For there are three bear record in heaven, the Father, the word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one.”
- (paraphrased) The verse above is not in the (RSV).
- Why is it [the verse above] not there? Because your [Christian] scholars, thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations, Bible scholars, say that this is another fabrication, another interpolation. So, they also threw it out without any ceremony.
- (paraphrased) The ascension which Swaggart quotes in his book is not in the (RSV) too.
- (paraphrased) Christians produce this book, and they say that this is the most up-

to-date Bible going to the most ancient manuscripts.

- I [Deedat] looked up for (Mark 16) I see it ends at verse eight. Nine to twenty is missing.
- **Counter Claim:** (paraphrased) There are chunks and chunks of the biblical texts which are not supposed to be there are there according to the thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence backed by fifty cooperating denominations.
- **Warrants:** Verses are being removed and put back again.
- (unstated) Bible scholars are in position to state some facts about the biblical texts.
- (unstated) Scriptural texts must not be altered.
- With reference to the previous argument, Swaggart has changed words of the Bible (KJV).

Therefore, the Bible is not the word of God.

Deedat in this argument employs two interconnected types of reasoning that support his counter claim. The first scheme is **argument from commitment** which can be put as follows:

- **Commitment evidence premise:** It was shown that Swaggart is committed in one of his videos to the proposition “Even one word, if it is not supposed to be there is there, the whole book should be thrown away.”
- **Linkage of commitment premise:** Generally, when he is committed to the proposition above, it can be inferred that he is also committed to the proposition “The Bible is not the word of God” if one word is changed in the Bible.
- **Extra premise1:** with reference to the next scheme, and the previous argument as well, chunks and chunks of words which were altered and being altered.
- **Extra premise2:** (paraphrased) In his book, Swaggart literally quotes John, chapter 5: 7 but the verse is not found in (RSV). In addition to the verses of the ascension, and Mark 16:16 are also altered in the (KJV).
- **Conclusion:** In this case, Swaggart is committed to the proposition that “The Bible is not the word of God.”

The second scheme is **argument from expert opinion** that supports the second premise and strengthens the claim. Deedat is using Swaggart’s publication against him. To illustrate, Swaggart, in one of his publications, recommends the audience to consult the experts of a certain subject if they want to anything about that subject. This means that he is approving the statements that are produced by the Bible scholars about the Bible. Therefore, he is also committed to what the thirty-two scholars of the highest eminence have stated about the Bible. The argument has the following structure:

- **Major premise:** The 32 Bible scholars are experts in the Bible studies and the biblical texts.
- **Minor premise:** They assert that verses such as (first John 5:7) are interpolation and fabrication.
- **Extra premise:** Swaggart quotes (first John 5:7) in one of his books.
- **Conclusion:** Therefore, the (KJV) may be taken to be is not the word of God.

Deedat backs up his argument with another evidence ‘the ascension’. He tries to prove that there are verses that are taken out of the Bible. Swaggart quotes two verses from

Mark that they were taken out from the (RSV). Deedat gives the reason behind the removal of the verses of the ascension from the (RSV). The highest eminent Bible scholars backed by fifty cooperating denominations have referred to them as a fabrication and they were interpolated, so, they throw it out.

As for the evaluation of the *argument from commitment*, the first CQ has been fulfilled since the evidence provided by Deedat that he has seen his opponent on a video tape is a solid one. The second CQ is also satisfied. Concerning *argument from expert opinion*, the Bible scholars have been approved by Swaggart. They literally asserted, according to Deedat, that (KJV) has so many errors. Accordingly, the argument satisfies the associated CQs of the scheme.

Deedat reveals another argument to be added to his chain of arguments. The premises used in his argument are that of what his opponent is committed to. The major premise employed in the first argument is a statement made by his opponent: **“Even one word, if it is not supposed to be there is there, the whole book should be thrown away.”** which is logically acceptable for both parties. It is also being used as a condition to judge whether a holy book is distorted or not. The premise **“I [Deedat] didn’t print this. ... manuscripts.”** is an indirect accusation that Bible scholars are the ones to be blamed because they print the Bible today. The pragmatic function of **“I didn’t print it, You Christians”** is to put more emphasis on the doers of the action, i.e., Christian scholars are responsible for the distortion of the Bible. The utterance **“most up-to-date Bible”** indicates that words and verses of the Bible are being changed. Because if there is an up-to-date book, there should be changes, omissions, additions and so on. The rhetorical questions **“Did I take it out? Did the Muslims took it out?”** can also be considered an indirect accusation to Christians that they alter the verses of the Bible. Deedat provides facts that there are chunks of words are removed and others are added. So, he moves back and forth from the (RSV) to the (KJV) to show the audience how the biblical texts are changed in these versions.

Ahmad Deedat

Brother Swaggart has written some beautiful books, beautiful books; Incest, pornography, Homosexuality, Alcohol, Sodom and Gomorrah, and I can’t imagine myself doing any better. Beautiful writings. Incest, he says the dark stain on our American society. It has reached epidemic proportion, incest. In my country, the whites of South Africa according to statistics, 8% of all white people they commit incest. 8%, one in every twelve is committing incest. I don’t know what is the percentage here. But brother Swaggart tells us that it has reached epidemic proportions in your mighty country, America. And he gives examples from the holy Bible. That there are ten cases of incest in the holy Bible. I didn’t know that. I knew that in the first book of the Bible, Genesis, there were four cases. Brother Swaggart’s book enlightened me. I got the fifth one in the first book. As if this is a text book on incest to tell you what are the types of incest you can commit? In a book of God! Ten cases of incest. And I am told that the type of food you eat, you eat junky food you become junky. You read junky stuff; your mind becomes junky. It is these types of things you read. Can’t you see that we are

getting programmed? Whatever you see, whatever you read, we are getting programmed. You read about incest, incest, incest: father with daughters, son with his mother, father-in-law with his daughter-in-law, brother with his sister!! What is this? Ten cases of incest! You read about incest, incest, incest. Little wonder that it has reached epidemic proportion. You see Dr. Vernon Jones, an American psychologist of great repute; he carried out experiments on groups of school children to whom certain stories were being read. And he said, "These stories make certain slight but permanent changes in character even in the narrow classroom situation." The type of stories that you read, the type of stories that they read, the things that they see that is the type of mentality they are going to have. So, I say book of God! Why would God Almighty Go out of his way in his holy book to reveal to you ten cases of incest coupled? Ten cases, so I say, therefore, my dear brothers and sisters, this is not the word of God.

Analysis

The pragmatic function of the components of the argument can be shown as follows:

- **Grounds:** Swaggart says in his books that incest has reached epidemic proportion.
- The whites of South Africa according to statistics, 8% of all white people they commit incest. 8%, one in every twelve is committing incest.
- (unstated) The holy Bible gives people the green light to commit incest.
- [According to Swaggart], there are ten cases of incest in the Bible.
- [the Bible] is a text book on incest to tell you what are the types of incest you can commit? In a book of God! Ten cases of incest!
- You read junky stuff; your mind becomes junky.
- Dr. Vernon Jones carried out experiments on groups of school children to whom certain stories were being read. And he said, "These stories make certain slight but permanent changes in character even in the narrow classroom situation."
- **Claim:** (unstated) The Bible is a reference for pornography and incest.
- **Warrants:** (unstated) Incest cannot be attributed to the word of God.
- (unstated) Incest is immoral that it may destroy communities in the sense that it could be a result of genetic abnormalities.
- (unstated) Incest is considered to be a sin that God never permitted.

Deedat employs a deductive type of reasoning in which the first warrant is said to be the general premise of the argument. The Bible represents the minor premise or the particular case in the argument. With reference to the criteria (**RSA**) of the argument evaluation, the three criteria are satisfied.

Deedat starts the argument by alluding to opponent's published books which tell that incest has reached epidemic proportion in America. He also reports how statistics of incest is 8% in South Africa. Deedat's argument is loaded with logical reasoning, he advances *cause and effect* logical reasoning. He implies that there is an obvious relationship between the distorted biblical teachings and the presented facts and statistics. The structure of the argument, **argument from cause**, can be put as follows:

- **Phenomenon 1:** Christians read the distorted Bible which contains incest.
- **Phenomenon 2:** Christians will be affected and they will commit incest.

This argument is supported by another argument that has a deductive type of reasoning:

- **General premise:** The type of food a man eats, the type of a person he becomes.
- **Minor premise:** The man eats junky food.
- **Conclusion:** The man becomes junky.

Deedat sets up the grounds for another logical reasoning that brings to light an *argument from analogy*, which it can be presented in the following structure:

- **Similarity premise:** Generally, reading incest is similar to that of eating junky food.
- **Base premise:** You will be junky if you eat junky food is true.
- **Conclusion:** You will commit incest if you read the Bible is also true

The point that Deedat wants to draw that reading the Bible is getting the reader programmed. He also alludes to Dr. Jones's experiment on a school of children to provide an additional support to his argument. Deedat asserts that he is not surprised for the epidemic proportion because there are ten cases of incest in the Bible.

2. 3. 3 Results and Discussion

The aim of this section is to show the statistical analysis of the data analyzed in the previous section. Concerning the use of the pragmatic components of argument, the results presented in Table (1) and Figure (3) reveal that grounds, as the primary pragmatic components, are the most frequent components utilized by Deedat. This is supported by its highest presence reached (26) times of use that has amounted the percentage (60.5%). The most frequent pragmatic components employed by Swaggart are also grounds which have reached (9) times of use with the percentage (45%).

Table (1): Statistical Comparison of the Pragmatic Components of Arguments in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

<i>Debaters</i> <i>Pragmatic Components</i>	Deedat		Swaggart		Total	
	Fre	Per	Fre	Per	Fre	Per
Grounds	26	60.5%	9	45%	35	55.6%
Claims	7	16.3%	4	20%	11	17.5%
Warrants	9	20.9%	5	25%	14	22.2%
Backings	0	0%	1	5%	1	1.6%
Rebuttals	1	2.3%	1	5%	2	3.8%
Qualifiers	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total	43	100%	20	100%	63	100%




Figure (3): Rates of the Pragmatic Components of Argument in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

Concerning the use of types of reasoning, as indicated in Table (2) and Figure (4) below, presumptive reasoning has been proved to be the dominant reasoning utilized by both debaters with (7) instances that have composed (70%) of Deedat's argumentation, and (3) occurrences of the scheme which represent (75%) of Swaggart's argumentation.

Table (2): Statistical Comparison of the Types of Reasoning in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

Debaters Types of reasoning	Deedat		Swaggart		Total	
	Fre	Per	Fre	Per	Fre	Per
Deductive	3	30%	0	0%	3	21.4%
Inductive	0	0%	1	25%	1	7.1%
Presumptive	7	70%	3	75%	10	71.5%
Total	10	100%	4	100%	14	100%




Figure (4): Rates of the Types of Reasoning in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

As far as ASs are concerned, argument from expert opinion has been proved to be the dominant scheme among the others in the context of I-CDs. As explained in Table (3) and Figure (5), this scheme has appeared (3) times with a percentage of (30%) for both debaters.

Table (3): Statistical Comparison of ASs in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

<i>Debaters</i> <i>Argumentation Schemes</i>	Deedat		Swaggart		Total	
	Fre	Per	Fre	Per	Fre	Per
Argument from expert opinion	2	28.6%	1	33.3%	3	30%
Argument from authority	1	14.3%	0	0%	1	10%
Argument from position to know	0	0%	1	33.3%	1	10%
Argument from commitment	1	14.3%	0	0%	1	10%
Argument from inconsistency	1	14.3%	0	0%	1	10%
Argument from analogy	1	14.3%	1	33.3%	2	20%
Argument from cause	1	14.3%	0	0%	1	10%
Total	7	100%	3	100%	10	100%




Figure (5): Rates of ASs in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

With regard to the three logical criteria (RSA) of argument evaluation, as shown in Table (4) and Figure (6), the highest percentage of satisfying these criteria goes for Deedat with (100%) of the total of (9) instances of applying these criteria, whereas the highest percentage of dissatisfying these criteria goes for Swaggart with the percentage (33.3%) with (3) occasions of applying the RSA.

Table (4): Statistical Comparison of (RSA) in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

<i>Debaters</i> <i>Pragmatic Criteria (RSA)</i>	Deedat		Swaggart		Total	
	Fre	Per	Fre	Per	Fre	Per
Satisfied	9	100%	2	66.6%	11	91.7%
Unsatisfied	0	0%	1	33.3%	1	8.3
Total	9	100%	3	100%	12	100%




Figure (6): Rates of (RSA) in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

Concerning CQs associated with the evaluation of ASs, as noticed in Table (5) and Figure (7), the total instances of applying CQs to the schemes employed by Deedat is (31). Satisfying these CQs occurs in (30) cases representing the highest percentage which amounts to (96.8%). Swaggart's arguments, on the other hand, satisfy (6) CQs out of (13) representing (46.2%).

Table (5): Statistical Comparison of (CQs) in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

Debaters \ CQs	Deedat		Swaggart		Total	
	Fre	Per	Fre	Per	Fre	Per
Satisfied	30	96.8%	6	46.2%	36	81.8%
Unsatisfied	1	3.2%	7	53.8%	8	18.2%
Total	31	100%	13	100%	44	100%




Figure (7): Rates of (CQs) in Deedat-Swaggart's Debate

2. 4 Conclusions

The current study has reached the following conclusions:

- Concerning the most frequent logical pragmatics strategies, the grounds of the arguments posed by Deedat and Swaggart take the highest percentages which reach to (60.5%, and 55.6% respectively). Warrants have been shown to be the next highest cut of the argumentative discourse with the percentage (20.9%) for Deedat and (25%) for Swaggart. Claims score the lowest percentage, within the primary parts of the argument, for both Deedat and Swaggart which amounts to (16.3%, and 20% respectively). The additional elements; backings, rebuttals, and qualifiers, take the following percentages for Deedat (0%, 2.3%, and 0% respectively) and (5%, 5%, and 0% respectively) for Swaggart.
- As for the most frequent type of reasoning employed, presumptive reasoning

wins over the other types in the context of I-CDs. This is clear by the total percentage of both debaters presented with (71.5%), whereas the most frequent AS is argument from expert opinion whose total percentage is (30%).

3. Concerning the three criteria of argument evaluation (RSA), the results of the analysis have revealed that these criteria are violated in Swaggart's argumentative discourse with the percentages (33.3%). They are completely satisfied by Deedat with the percentage (100%).

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